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In 1995, Mexico introduced a price-level-adjusting unit of
account called the Unidad de Inversion (UDI). Loans
denominated in UDIs maintain their purchasing power and
provide a real rate of return in pesos. This study examines the
real rate of return earned by dollar investors in UDI mortgages
and the extent to which the inﬂation-adjusting aspect of the UDI
mitigates losses from currency devaluations. Exchange-rate
patterns relative to purchasing power parity are also examined to
ﬁnd investment strategies that increase the real-dollar rate of
return on investments in Mexico’s UDI mortgages.
Introduction
There is a housing shortage in Mexico that continues to worsen.1 A major
contributing cause is insufﬁcient capital ﬂowing into the Mexican mortgage
market. The reasons are many, including the fact that the level of income is low
and sources of income are unreliable for much of the population. The
infrastructure for the mortgage market is much improved in recent years but
remains inadequate, which exacerbates default and liquidity risks.2 Default and
inﬂation risks associated with long-term lending have been high in the volatile
Mexican economy, which suffered from bouts of very high inﬂation and
unemployment, and declining real wages in the 1980s and 1990s. A separate risk,
exchange-rate risk, awaits foreign investors who might supply capital to the
Mexican mortgage market by investing in peso-denominated mortgages. Each of
these forms of risk has been reduced somewhat in recent years. The government
has made an effort to reduce liquidity risk by working toward the development of
a secondary mortgage market. Similarly, both default and inﬂation risks were
reduced in 1995 when the Mexican government introduced an inﬂation-adjusting
unit of account called the Unidad de Inversion (UDI).324  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt
‘‘The UDI can be thought of as a parallel currency that tracks inﬂation and is
converted to pesos at the time of payment. This unit adjusts (in terms of pesos/
UDI) daily with inﬂation and can be used to price investments and loans,’’(Softec,
2001). Mortgage loans denominated in UDIs eliminate the risk of loss in
purchasing power for lenders/investors that fund from peso sources of capital.
The UDI interest rate is low relative to the peso interest rate because the UDI rate
has no component for expected inﬂation and no risk premium for unexpected
inﬂation. Compared to other inﬂation-coping mortgages available in Mexico in
the recent past, UDIs lessen the likelihood of mortgage default.4
It is the purpose of this study to show that UDI mortgages also reduce exchange-
rate risk for mortgage lenders/investors that have foreign capital as their source
of funding. If UDI mortgages can be shown to mitigate much of the exchange-
rate risk for dollar investors, the ﬂow of capital into the Mexican mortgage market
might increase and more housing will be built. The research question is to what
extent does the UDI’s inﬂation-adjusting aspect mitigate the exchange-rate risk
for dollar investors and can investment strategies based on the peso’s strength
relative to purchasing-power-parity (PPP) lead to real-dollar returns that equal or
exceed real-peso returns on UDIs? If exchange-rate mitigation is signiﬁcant, there
is less need to enter into hedging strategies to protect against exchange-rate losses.
Moreover, if UDI mortgages provide a natural mitigation or hedge of peso risk
for dollar investors, that is one less impediment to the ﬂow of capital into the
Mexican mortgage market.5
The next section describes the mechanics of UDI mortgages including an example
of the UDI mortgage payment and amortization calculation. In the following
section, UDI mortgages are simulated to obtain the nominal and real rates of return
in both pesos and dollars using Mexico’s economic data from 1982 to 1998. This
is followed by an examination of changes in the real-dollar return relative to the
real peso return over a 17-year period. The purchasing-power-parity between the
peso and the dollar is examined in an effort to establish an investment strategy
for dollar investors to further mitigate exchange-rate risk. The ﬁnal section is the
conclusion.
 Mechanics of UDI Mortgages
The UDI mortgage calculation provides a real-rate of return for the mortgage
lender/investor. As an example, assume a homebuyer borrows 250,000 pesos to
purchase a house. The loan will be cast in UDIs with an interest rate of 12%,
which is ﬁxed for the 15-year term of the loan. The homebuyer contracts to borrow
the UDI equivalent of 250,000 pesos. For the purposes of this example, say that
one UDI is worth one peso on the day the loan is made. Thus, the borrower
contracts to repay 250,000 UDIs plus 12% interest in 15 equal annual payments.6
Each payment of principal and interest is for the peso equivalent of 36,706.06
UDIs. Also for the purposes of this example, assume that inﬂation is 20% perThe Case of the Mexican UDI  25
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1 36,706.06 1.200 44,047.27 243,293.94 291,952.73
2 36,706.06 1.440 52,856.73 235,783.15 339,527.74
3 36,706.06 1.728 63,428.07 227,371.07 392,897.21
4 36,706.06 2.074 76,113.69 217,949.54 451,940.17
5 36,706.06 2.488 91,336.42 207,397.42 516,071.16
6 36,706.06 2.986 109,603.71 195,579.06 583,995.93
7 36,706.06 3.583 131,524.45 182,342.48 653,366.08
8 36,706.06 4.300 157,829.34 167,517.52 720,294.68
9 36,706.06 5.160 189,395.21 150,913.56 778,680.84
10 36,706.06 6.192 227,274.25 132,317.13 819,272.80
11 36,706.06 7.430 272,729.10 111,489.13 828,373.55
12 36,706.06 8.916 327,274.92 88,161.76 786,059.13
13 36,706.06 10.700 392,729.90 62,035.11 663,733.57
14 36,706.06 12.839 471,275.88 32,773.27 420,782.04
15 36,706.06 15.407 565,531.06 — 0.00
Notes:
Loan Amount in Pesos  $250,000
Real Interest Rate  12%
Term of Loan in Years  15
Number of UDIs Borrowed  250,000
Annual Payments in UDIs  36,706.06
Annual Inﬂation Rate  20%
year in each of the 15 years of the loan. Although the payment is ﬁxed in terms
of UDIs, the peso value of the payment changes each year with the peso/UDI
conversion index that is growing at the rate of 20% per year.7
The ﬁrst payment occurs one year after the loan is made. The borrower will
consult the UDI conversion index to ﬁnd the peso equivalent of an UDI on the
day the payment is due. In the example, at the end of the ﬁrst year, an UDI is
worth 1.2 pesos, as indicated in Exhibit 1. Therefore the borrower will pay the
lender 44,047.27 pesos (36,706.06 UDIs  1.2 pesos per UDI). The second year,
the borrower will pay 52,856.73 pesos (36,706.06 UDIs  1.44 pesos per UDI).
Following the ﬁrst payment, the remaining balance of the loan is 243,293.94 UDIs.
If the borrower wanted to prepay the balance at the end of the ﬁrst year, he/she
would pay 291,952.73 pesos (243,293.94 UDIs  1.2 pesos per UDI). Exhibit 126  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt









































































































shows each of the 15 payments and their associated loan balances in terms of
UDIs and in terms of peso equivalents.
Curves of the payments in UDIs and in pesos are shown in Exhibit 2. The
payments are ﬁxed at 36,706.06 UDIs over the life of the loan, but the peso value
of the payments grows dramatically and peaks at the end of 15 years with a ﬁnal
payment of 565,531.06 pesos.
Exhibit 3 shows plots of the UDI and peso for the balances. The curve of UDI
balances exhibits the typical appearance of an amortization pattern for constant-The Case of the Mexican UDI  27
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payment ﬁxed-rate loans. The decline in the UDI balance is continuous and
accelerating. However, in terms of pesos, the balance increases initially until it
peaks at 828,373.55 pesos following the payment in year 11. Then, the peso
balance begins to decline and reaches zero following the 15th payment.
As a check to verify that the mechanics of the UDI mortgage result in a 12% real
peso rate of return, the peso balance after the 14th payment, 420,782.04, can be
multiplied by 1.20 to adjust for 20% inﬂation in the ﬁnal year of the loan. Then,
the inﬂation-adjusted balance can be increased by 12% to allow for interest that
has accrued for the year. The result is $565,531.06 ($420,782.04  1.20  1.12),
which is the same as the ﬁnal peso payment that was originally calculated by
multiplying the ﬁxed UDI payment, 36,706.06, by the current UDI conversion
index, 15.4070. This comparison illustrates that the inﬂation-adjusting mortgage-
amortization scheme employed in the UDI system does in fact yield a real return
in pesos at the speciﬁed interest rate. Thus, the lender has received a repayment
of 250,000 real-pesos and a real-rate of return of 12%.
Simulation of Returns Using Mexico’s Historical Inflation
The UDI system is modeled after the price-level adjusting mortgages (PLAMs)
used in Brazil in the past, as described by Anderson and Lessard in Lessard and
Modigliani (1975). The UDI mortgage loan process begins with the origination
of the loan for a speciﬁed number of pesos. The loan originator establishes the
term of the loan, the payment frequency and the real rate of interest, all of which
are ﬁxed for the life of the loan. The real rate is a combination of a real interest
rate in the classic sense plus a risk premium appropriate to the particular mortgage
loan. On the day the loan is originated, the peso value of the principal is translated
into UDIs using the UDI Index. From that time forward, the principal balance of
the loan is denominated in UDIs, and payments and the amortization schedule are
calculated in UDIs. When payment is due, the number of UDIs owed is translated
back into pesos, using the current value of the UDI Index. The UDI’s value was
initially set at one-to-one with the peso on April 4, 1995, and continues to increase
over time with the Mexican Consumer Price Index. On the 10th and 26th of each
month, the Bank of Mexico publishes the index of an UDI’s value for the next
15 days. The value of an UDI changes daily. The UDI value as of October 25,
2002 was 3.18 pesos/UDI.
Mexican UDIs did not exist until April of 1995. However, in order to simulate
the peso return that UDI mortgages would have earned had they existed as far
back as January 1983, the actual inﬂation data is used to create a representative
UDI Index. The inﬂation data used in this study begins in December 1982 with
the Mexican Consumer Price Index (CPI) at 1.13 and ends in January 2001 with
the CPI at 338.42.8 Thus, a representative UDI Index that would have existed had
Mexico initiated the UDI system in January 1983 can be created. Therefore, the
representative UDI Index begins at 1.00 peso per UDI at the end of December28  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt

















































1982 and ends at 298.62 pesos per UDI on January 31, 2001. The representative
UDI Index is plotted in Exhibit 4.
In each month of the study, an origination of a new UDI loan is simulated. The
loan could be for any amount. The study assumes that there are no defaults. The
loan has a real interest rate of 12% and a term of 15 years with monthly payments.9
The origination of a new UDI loan is simulated at the beginning of each month
between January 1983 and February 1997, a period of 170 months. Thus, there
are 170 loans, each beginning in a different month.
The loan that is originated in January 1983 matures 15-years later, in December
1997. The loan originated at the end of January 1985 and all subsequent loans do
not reach maturity, but prepay the remaining balance in December 2000. The last
loan is originated at the end of January 1997, which allows 48 months of
amortization before paying off the balance at the end of December 2000. All
unpaid balances were accelerated at the end of December 2000 because that was
the end of the data set. Calculating the IRR in UDIs conﬁrms that the rate of
return in UDIs, and therefore the real rate of return in pesos, is indeed 12%.
Barring default, an UDI loan will always yield the intended real rate of return to
peso lenders/investors.
Nominal payments are determined by multiplying the payment amount in UDIs
by the number of pesos per UDI prescribed by the current value of the UDI Index.
The nominal rate of return for each loan is calculated as the IRR of the peso cash
ﬂows. The nominal rate of return changes with each loan because it is a function
of the changing rate of inﬂation. Exhibit 5 plots the nominal IRR for each of the
170 loans above the corresponding origination date.
The highest nominal-peso rate of return over the life of a loan, 65.36%, is a loan
that originated in January 1983. The lowest peso rate of return was 25.18% on aThe Case of the Mexican UDI  29
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loan that was originated in February 1997. The nominal-peso return for 170 loans
had a mean of 40.08% and a standard deviation of 14.56%. Between January 1983
and January 1986 the average nominal peso rate of return was 63.11%. During
that same 3-year period, annual inﬂation in Mexico was 54.37%.
Dollar Returns
The exchange rate between the peso and the U.S. dollar was 0.02 pesos per dollar
at the end of January 1983 and peaked at 10.21 pesos per dollar in September
1998.10 It declined to 9.28 in August of 2000 and rose again to 9.77 by January
2001. With respect to the dollar, the value of the peso declined 99.01% in 18
years.
In the past, dollar investors have viewed exchange-rate risk as among the most
serious impediments to investing in loans denominated in Mexican pesos.11 To
determine if such fears are warranted with respect to UDI investments, the peso
cash ﬂows for UDI mortgages are recalculated based on the dollar equivalent.
Peso cash ﬂows are translated into dollars at the prevailing exchange rate and the
IRR is calculated to provide a nominal-dollar rate of return.12 The real-dollar
return for each loan was also calculated. The real rate is determined using the
U.S. Consumer Price Index to adjust each dollar received to the value of a dollar
on the day the loan was originated. Exhibit 6 shows the nominal rate of return
and the real rate of return for dollar investors.
Clearly the nominal-dollar return is less than the nominal-peso return. On the
other hand, the average real-dollar rate of return, 14.39%, is higher than the real-
peso return of 12%. Exhibit 7 summarizes the rates of return in pesos and dollars
and the inﬂation rates in both countries from 1983 through 2000.30  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt









































Average 41.41 40.08 12.00 3.70 17.52 14.39
Std. Dev. 43.41 14.56 0.00a 1.18 3.62 3.45
Max. Value 176.83 65.86 12.00 15.66 26.21 23.75
Min. Value 7.50 25.18 12.00 1.43 11.08 8.45
Note: All values are percentages.
aThe standard deviation of the real peso IRR is zero because it never deviates from 12%.
Improving the Real-Dollar Rate of Return
No dollar investments in the simulated UDI mortgages lost money. The real-dollar
return was 14.39% on average, which is higher than the 12% real-peso return.
However, the standard deviation of the distribution of real-dollar returns was
3.45%, which is clearly less desirable than the zero standard deviation of the real-
peso return. The wide variation in real-dollar returns is obviously a function of
the changing exchange rate and inﬂation in the two countries. However, changes
among those three variables (i.e., the currency price and the two rates of inﬂation)
may follow a predictable pattern, possibly creating an investment rule that can not
only raise the average real-dollar return but lower the standard deviation of the
distribution as well.The Case of the Mexican UDI  31
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In economic theory, purchasing power parity (PPP) suggests that exchange rates
are a function of relative prices, so that (using the U.S. and Mexico as examples):
MP/USD  P /P (1) mx us
where MP is Mexican Pesos, USD is U.S. dollars, Pmx is the Mexican price level
and Pus is the U.S. price level. In the event that MP/USD  Pmx/Pus, this means
that the average price (in terms of a common currency) of goods and services in
one country is relatively lower than that in the other. This creates arbitrage
opportunities that drive the system back to equality. PPP can be expressed both
as levels (absolute PPP) and rates of change (relative PPP).
Despite its intuitive appeal, the empirical record of PPP is mixed at best. That
said however, it has proved relatively more useful when at least one of the two
economies examined has experienced high rates of inﬂation (Frenkel, 1978;
Edison, 1985; Taylor and McMahon, 1988; McNown and Wallace 1989; Liu,
1992; and Zhou, 1997). Clearly, that is the case with Mexico, and, in fact,
numerous studies have found support for PPP with respect to the speciﬁc case of
the USD-MP exchange rate (e.g., Ghoshroy-Saha and Van Den Berg, 1996).
The sample period in this study was from January 1983 through February 1997.
The start date coincides with a prolonged period of market liberalization and an
increasing international focus on the part of Mexican business leaders and policy
makers (Cockcroft, 1998). Any conclusions drawn from an earlier period would
be of questionable value to those wishing to invest in the future.
The following regression was estimated:
MP/USD  0.608  14.08 (P /P ) mx us (2) (0.746)
where the parenthetical value is the asymptotic standard error.13 If the values for
Pmx/Pus are taken and the equation used to generate PPP values for the exchange
rate, the peso is found to be overvalued (relative to PPP) from the beginning of
the sample period (January 1983) through June 1987, undervalued from July 1987
through November 1990 (with a brief period of overvaluation from December
1988 to February 1989), overvalued again from December 1990 through
November 1994 and undervalued from December 1994 through the March 2000
(see Exhibits 8 and 9).14 From April 2000 the peso value vacillates only slightly
above and below PPP until the end of the sample period in January 2001.
Returning to the goal of increasing dollar returns and reducing variability, if PPP
holds in Mexico, then periods of undervaluation (again, relative to the predicted32  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt

















































































PPP value) should forecast peso appreciations and periods of overvaluation should
anticipate peso depreciations. Hence a simple rule can be created using the ratio
of the U.S. and Mexican price levels in combination with Equation (2) and the
actual prevailing exchange rate. At its most basic level, that rule is to buy
mortgages only when the prevailing MP/USD is greater than the PPP MP/USD.
Take January 1993 as an example, a period during which economists were arguing
that the peso was overvalued (just over a year after this Mexico would experience
a major ﬁnancial crisis partly because of that overvaluation). For that month, MP/
USD  3.11 and Pmx/Pus  0.212. Inserting the latter into Equation (2) gives
(MP/USD)PPP  3.59 (where (MP/USD)PPP is the exchange rate that wouldThe Case of the Mexican UDI  33
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prevail if PPP held), implying that the peso was overvalued by some 15%. This
would suggest not buying mortgages, as the anticipated peso depreciation will
reduce the proﬁtability of the investment in dollar terms. Indeed, a mortgage
purchased that month would have earned 10.25%, markedly below the sample-
period average of 14.39%. The same calculations for June 1996, however, yield
MP/USD  7.54 and (MP/USD)PPP  6.03, or a peso undervalued by 20%.
Mortgages purchased that month would have earned 18.55%.
Exhibit 10 shows the inverse relationship between the value of the peso relative
to the PPP and the real-dollar return relative to the real-peso return. Clearly the
return on the dollar is greater when the peso is undervalued.
One can make the rule more or less restrictive, as tastes for risk warrant. Exhibit
11 shows the effect of setting a ﬁlter that requires the peso to be undervalued by
particular levels before mortgages are purchased (in each case comparing those
numbers to the alternative). Filter rules that dictated investing if the peso was
undervalued by 3%, 5% and 10% were tested. As is evident from the exhibit
regardless of which speciﬁc rule is adopted, the goal of increasing returns and
lowering volatility is achieved an estimate of PPP is used as a guideline.
Recall that the original estimate of the PPP equation (the one used in the
calculations for Exhibit 11) was based on data from January 1983 to January
2001. In reality, investors could not have made decisions in 1985, for example,34  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt
Exhibit 11  Investment Rules and Related Returns, Using Whole-Period Estimate of PPP
Period Min. (%) Max. (%) Average (%) Std. Dev. (%) Months
Total 8.45 23.75 14.39 3.44 170
Undervaluation 9.80 23.75 16.95 2.58 65
Overvaluation 8.45 19.91 12.81 2.92 105
Undervaluation 3.0% of PPP 12.70 23.75 18.19 2.15 41
Otherwise 8.45 19.91 13.18 2.85 129
Undervaluation 5.0% of PPP 12.70 23.75 18.79 2.00 31
Otherwise 8.45 19.91 13.41 2.89 139
Undervaluation 10.0% of PPP 12.70 23.75 19.00 1.94 28
Otherwise 8.45 19.91 13.48 2.91 142
Notes: Values are real-dollar rates of return.
based on future data (February 1985 through January 2001). In practice, investors
are forced to work with PPP estimates derived only from data available at the
time the decision is being made. Therefore Equation (2) was re-estimated with
that in mind. For investment decisions made starting in January 1985, for example,
an estimate of the equation was used based on the previous twenty-three months
that were available at that date: January 1983 through November 1984. Exchange
rate data are available without a lag, but CPI numbers in both countries are
released during the following month, which means that January’s CPI is not
available until sometime in February.
One’s ﬁrst inclination is to update the PPP equation every month as new price
and exchange rate data become available. However, economic theory would
suggest otherwise. As PPP is considered to be a very long-term phenomenon, it
is unwise to re-estimate the relationship with great frequency. Currencies will stray
from PPP levels, and may do so for many years at a time; sample periods must
be large enough to allow for corrections to have occurred. Thus, this study updated
the estimates only after ﬁve additional years of data were available (still being
careful not to include observations that would have been unavailable at the time).
Exhibit 12 shows the regressions as calculated at various points in the sample
period. Recall that these numbers are used by investors to create the PPP exchange
rate, against which the actual exchange rate is compared. The row of coefﬁcients
in the exhibit simply repeats Equation (2), included for comparison purposes. The
next line shows an estimate for the January 1983 through November 1984 sub-
period (as mentioned above). This would be employed by investors making
decisions from January 1985 through December 1989. A new regression would
then be run including data up to November 1989 (shown in the next line).The Case of the Mexican UDI  35
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Exhibit 12  PPP Estimates Using Past-Data Only: MP/USD     (Pmx/Pus)
Period  Std. Error Used to Forecast
1/83–2/97 0.608 14.080 0.746 NA
1/83–11/84 0.041 14.364 0.053 1/85–12/89
1/83–11/89 0.229 16.224 1.791 1/90–12/94
1/83–11/94 0.476 12.749 1.302 1/95–2/97
Exhibit 13  Investment Rules and Related Returns, Using Pre-Investment Data Only
Period Min. (%) Max. (%) Average (%) Std. Dev. (%) Months
Total 8.45 23.75 14.57 3.66 146
Undervaluation 11.35 23.75 16.85 2.48 92
Overvaluation 8.45 13.38 10.68 1.33 54
Undervaluation 3.0% of PPP 13.53 23.75 16.99 2.38 89
Otherwise 8.45 13.67 10.78 1.38 57
Undervaluation 5.0% of PPP 13.53 23.75 17.28 2.34 80
Otherwise 8.45 14.51 11.27 1.78 66
Undervaluation 10.0% of PPP 13.65 23.75 17.44 2.30 76
Otherwise 8.45 15.10 11.45 1.89 70
Notes: Values are real-dollar rates of return.
These numbers are used to create the PPP exchange rate from January 1990 to
December 1994. Finally, the data are updated again to go through November 1994.
The new estimate is used to guide investors from January 1995 to the end of the
time period (February 1997).
Exhibit 13 is identical to Exhibit 11 except that determinations of the degree by
which the peso is over or undervalued are based on PPP regressions that could
have been run by agents of the investors at that time (the coefﬁcients shown in
Exhibit 12), using data for ‘‘current’’ currency prices and inﬂation indices.
Nevertheless, Exhibit 13 shows that a signiﬁcant improvement in both return and
the variability thereof is had by choosing to buy Mexican mortgages only when
the peso is undervalued.15 The rule can, therefore, be employed by investors even
under more realistic restrictions regarding the availability of data at the time that
decisions must be made.36  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt
 Conclusion
Enabling markets to function more efﬁciently, thus, providing the capital needed
to better house the country’s population, is an important goal of the Mexican
government. The risks associated with investing in Mexican mortgages have been
excessive, as evidenced by the country’s historically high mortgage interest rates.
Today, the few Mexicans who can access the formal mortgage market still pay an
exceptionally high real rate of interest. This extreme cost of mortgage ﬁnancing
continues to reduce the quantity and quality of housing that Mexicans can afford.
Thus, the solution is to reduce lenders’ risk and uncertainty, which should in turn
reduce mortgage interest rates, attract more capital and improve housing
affordability.
Mexico could beneﬁt greatly from an inﬂux of foreign capital seeking to take
advantage of the country’s high real mortgage rates. However, international
investors tend to fear exchange rate risks associated with peso investments.
Between January 1983 and January 2001, the peso lost 99.01% of its value with
respect to the U.S. dollar. This history of a near total loss in peso value raises
concerns that the value of dollar investments in peso-denominated securities will
be eroded, possibly to negative rates of return. This study demonstrates that the
UDI mortgage has the potential to mitigate that risk, thus allaying some of the
apprehension harbored by international investors considering investing in Mexican
mortgages. The salient question is, does Mexico’s price-level-adjusting UDI
mortgage provide adequate exchange-rate risk mitigation or is the risk of
exchange-rate loss too great for dollar investors?
To answer that question, the origination of UDI mortgages was simulated each
month between January 1983 and January 1997 and they were treated as though
the lender/investor was purchasing them with dollars. No external exchange-rate
protection was provided. Only the implicit protection of inﬂation adjustments was
in effect. The results indicated that the real-dollar rate of return was slightly greater
on average than the peso return (14.39% compared to 12% per year). The
difference was a net proﬁt in the currency translations in and out of the peso.
Although the dollar return may be high (depending on total risk), the standard
deviation is also high, 3.45% per year, given that the real peso return exhibited a
standard deviation of zero.
An examination of individual mortgages revealed the following: the real-dollar
return ranged from a maximum of 23.75% to a low of 8.45%, even though the
real-peso return was ﬁxed at 12%. Noting that all of the deviation above and
below 12% was attributable to exchange rate ﬂuctuations, the study examined the
consequences of investing only when the peso was weak with respect to the dollar.
Mortgages were not purchased in any month in which the peso was strong.
To gauge the strength of the peso, its value was estimated based on purchasing
power parity theory. Cointegration regression methodology was employed to
estimate the theoretical exchange rate as indicated by PPP. A simple rule wasThe Case of the Mexican UDI  37
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established that said to invest dollars in UDIs only when the peso was undervalued
with respect to PPP. Following that simple rule, the average real-dollar return
increased from 14.57% to 16.85%. At the same time, the standard deviation of
returns fell from 3.66% to 2.48%.
Three times this rule was modiﬁed, investing when the peso was undervalued by
at least 3%, then 5%, and ﬁnally, 10%. In each case, the average return increased
and standard deviation decreased even more. As an example, if mortgages were
purchased only when the peso was at least 10% undervalued, the return increased
to 17.44% and the standard deviation reduced to 2.30%. The least restrictive rule,
to invest whenever the peso is undervalued by any amount, limited investment
opportunities to 92 of 146 months, or 63% of the time. The most restrictive rule,
to invest only if the peso is undervalue by 10% or more, still allowed the investor
to participate in the market in 76 out of 146 months.
The macroeconomic impact of numerous foreign investors following the strategy
of buying UDI mortgages when the peso is undervalued should push the peso
toward its PPP value. This in turn lowers the exchange rate proﬁts that produce
real-dollar returns that exceed real-peso returns. The real-dollar return would be
driven closer to the real-peso return while simultaneously reducing the standard
deviation. Similarly, a sizeable increase in the amount of foreign capital ﬂowing
into Mexico’s UDI mortgages should drive down the real rate on UDI mortgages,
thus making housing more affordable and mortgage ﬁnancing more available.
The ﬁndings indicate that had they existed prior to 1983, UDI mortgages would
have mitigated most of the exchange-rate risk between 1983 and 2000. Although
UDI mortgages were not available in 1983, they are now and have been since the
government introduced them in 1995. In future transactions the price-level-
adjusting feature of UDI mortgages will mitigate much of the exchange-rate risk.
However, there is no guarantee that the exchange-rate patterns of the past will
repeat themselves. In the past ﬁfteen years, the peso/dollar exchange rate has
deviated from its theoretical value, eventually returning to PPP. As long as the
relationship between PPP and the peso value continues to hold, dollar investments
in UDI mortgages will not suffer signiﬁcant exchange-rate losses.
 Appendix
Many researchers have found that the time series used for modeling PPP are non-
stationary. This means that data have trends, seasonal patterns or variances that
change over time. When that is the case, a basic assumption regarding the
asymptotic properties of the phenomenon in question is being violated. This can
lead to serious errors, such as spurious regression.
As a consequence, the ﬁrst step was to test the price levels and exchange rate for
unit roots (e.g., Dutton and Strauss, 1997; and Flores, Jorion, Preumont and
Szafarz, 1999). This is shown in Exhibit 1A. The fact that the levels exhibit unit
roots but the differences do not (regardless of how the equation is speciﬁed)38  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt
Exhibit 1A  Unit Root Tests (assuming an intercept)




Without Trend Levels ADF 0.033 0.090 1.599 1.238 2.88
1st Differences ADF 3.127 [8] 2.994 3.298 [3] 3.540 [3] 2.88
With Trend Levels ADF 2.469 2.347 0.427 1.453 3.44
1st Differences ADF 3.814 [7] 3.598 [9] 4.617 [3] 4.365 [3] 3.44
Notes: ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic. Bolded entries reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root (i.e., non-stationarity) at the 5% level or better (if an entry below the variable name
shows a value less than the critical one listed on the right then the null hypothesis is rejected). The
number of lagged differences is twelve unless a bracketed number appears beside the test statistic,
in which case that value is the lagged differences employed. These were selected using the
criterion suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) whereby a maximum value for the lagged
differences was selected (twelve is the standard choice in monthly studies and thus served as the
max) and then reduced by one until stationarity was achieved. As the ADF tests on levels never
achieved stationarity, the results are reported using twelve lagged differences.
Exhibit 2A  Johansen Cointegration Test: Exchange Rate and Price Ratio
Null Likelihood Ratio Test 5% Critical Value
r  0 18.54 15.41
r  1 2.45 3.76
Notes: Data assume an intercept and trend. Bolded entries reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration at the 5% level or better (if an entry below the variable name shows a value greater
than the critical one listed then the null hypothesis is rejected). Lagged intervals (pairs): 1, 10.
Drawing again on Campbell and Peron (1991; see the documentation accompanying Exhibit 1),
the test started with twelve and the number was reduced until the null hypothesis was rejected.
There was, in any event, only a minor difference in the parameter estimates reported in Equation
(2) regardless of the assumption we made with respect to lagged intervals. r  n indicates null
hypothesis of n cointegrating vectors.
indicates that USD/MP, Pus and Pmxare I(1), or integrated of order one (note that
the last proves to be integrated of order one only when trend is assumed).
This is, in one sense, bad news since it means that testing PPP using standard
methods runs the risk of spurious regression. On the other hand, it is possible to
test to see if a linear combination of such integrated series is stationary (meaningThe Case of the Mexican UDI  39
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that they are caused by a common process, a process that cancels out if estimated
properly). If so, then statistical support is had for PPP, and an estimate of the
relationship can be made. This is accomplished with a Johansen cointegration test
(see Exhibit 2A).
Note that regardless of the particular assumptions made with respect to trend or
the intercept, the exchange rate and price ratio series are cointegrated (i.e., their
non-stationarity is caused by a common process). This implies that at least a weak
form of absolute PPP does hold for the USD-MP exchange rate. All estimates of
the PPP relationship in the study employed the Johansen cointegration technique.
 Endnotes
1 In the 2000 Census, there were 97.3 million Mexican citizens living in 21.5 million
households. The occupancy level is 4.5 persons in Mexico. That can be compared to
2.3 in the United States. The average size of houses in Mexico is 700 square feet,
compared to an average of 1900 square feet in the United States. Moreover, of the 21.5
million houses in Mexico, approximately one-half are believed to be substandard due
to age or inferior construction. Fewer than half the houses in Mexico are built in the
formal market by developers or builders. Over half the housing in Mexico is self-built,
meaning no developers or building companies were involved. The land on which self-
built houses are built may or may not be owned by or titled to the persons building the
house and not all, if any, utilities are available. Most of these units are not eligible for
mortgage ﬁnancing. The housing consulting ﬁrm, Softec, estimates that the potential
market for housing will average approximately 1.6 million new units per year until 2010,
but the actual production is likely to be 800,000 units, half built in the formal market
and half self-built. The source of this information is Mexican Housing Overview 2002,
published by Softec, S.C., 2001, Mexico City.
2 Mortgage markets are underdeveloped because of deﬁciencies in infrastructure such as
little or no credit reporting for individuals, no title insurance, no mortgage insurance,
and problems with laws pertaining to foreclosure and assignment of liens. Moreover,
there are economic problems that have affected the capital markets, particularly the
market for long-term debt, especially home mortgages. A complete description of
Mexico’s mortgage market and its deﬁciencies as they existed in 1994 can be found in
the Barry, Castan ˜eda and Lipscomb (1994).
3 Unidad de Inversion is Spanish for Unit of Investment. The acronym UDI is pronounced
‘‘oo-dee.’’ A clarifying example of the UDI mortgage with payment and amortization
calculations is provided in the next section.
4 The Lipscomb and Hunt (1999) study conducted a historical simulation of UDI
mortgages using Mexico’s economic data from 1982 to 1998. The study showed that
had UDI mortgages been used in Mexico between 1982 and 1998, mortgage defaults
would have been limited to a manageable level.
5 Economic theory tells us that an inﬂation differential between two countries is one of
the drivers of exchange rate changes, particularly when one country has signiﬁcantly
higher inﬂation. It stands to reason that an inﬂation adjusting investment would have
the effect of offsetting some of the exchange rate losses. Similarly, exchange rate
changes also reﬂect interest rate differentials between two countries. It is also well40  Lipscomb, Harvey and Hunt
recognized that exchange rate losses tend to be compensated for by higher interest rates,
which has clearly been the case in Mexico.
6 UDI mortgages normally require monthly payments. Annual payments were used in this
example to keep it simple and to permit an observation of the character of each payment
throughout the term of the loan.
7 The actual UDI Index is tied to Mexico’s inﬂation rate. The term ‘‘conversion index’’
is used instead of UDI Index in this example to avoid confusion later when an UDI
Index is created for the simulation.
8 A 29,862% increase in the CPI in just 18 years.
9 At the time of this analysis, 12% per year was the real rate charged by GMAC
Financiera. As of December 2002, that rate had dropped to 9.75% per year.
10 The 1983 peso price is stated in terms of new pesos. In 1993, Mexico issued the new
peso to replace the old peso. One new peso was worth 1000 old pesos.
11 This information was gained from personal conversations with New York investment
bankers operating in Mexico in 1993 and 1994.
12 Exchange rate data from Banco de Mexico was used.
13 Because the study discovered that USD/MP, Pus and Pmx were integrated of order one,
it was necessary to use a Johansen cointegration test to estimate Equation 2. This is
discussed in the Appendix.
14 Because of scale issues in Exhibit 8, which is inﬂuenced by the extreme overvaluation
of the peso from 1983 to 1986, Exhibit 9 is included, which begins in June 1987 when
the peso is equal to PPP.
15 The returns and standard deviations are not as favorable as those of Exhibit 11, but the
number of months that the dollar investor is in the market is far greater.
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